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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1462
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CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et
al., PETITIONERS v. JOSE RAMON MORALES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[April 25, 1995]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In 1981, the State of California amended its parole
procedures to allow the Board of Prison Terms to
decrease the frequency of parole suitability hearings
under certain circumstances.  This case presents the
question whether the application of this amendment to
prisoners who committed their crimes before it was
enacted violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  We conclude
that it does not.

                            I
  California twice has convicted respondent Jose Ramon
Morales of murder.  In 1971, the body of respondent's
girlfriend, Gina Wallace, was found in an abandoned
medical building.  She had been shot in the head, neck,
and abdomen; her right thumb had been amputated and
her face slashed repeatedly.  A bloody fingerprint near
the body matched respondent's.  A jury found respondent
guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to
life in prison.
  While serving his sentence at the State Training
Facility in Soledad, California, respondent met Lois
Washabaugh, a 75-year-old woman who had begun
visiting inmates after gaining an interest in prison
reform.  Ms. Washabaugh visited respondent on numer-
ous occasions, and respondent kept in contact with her
through correspondence.  Respondent's letters eventually
expressed a romantic interest in Ms. Washabaugh, and
the two were married some time after respondent's
release to a halfway house in April 1980.
  On July 4, 1980, Ms. Washabaugh left her home and
told friends that she was moving to Los Angeles to live
with her new husband.  Three days later, police officers
found a human hand on the Hollywood Freeway in Los
Angeles.  Ms. Washabaugh was reported missing at the
end of July, and fingerprint identification revealed that
the hand was hers.  Her body was never recovered.
Respondent was subsequently arrested and found in pos-
session of Ms. Washabaugh's car, purse, credit cards,
and diamond rings.
  Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the second-
degree murder of Ms. Washabaugh.  He was sentenced
to a term of 15 years to life, but became eligible for
parole beginning in 1990.  As required by California law,
see Cal. Penal Code Ann. 3041 (West 1982), the Board
of Prison Terms (the Board) held a hearing on July 25,
1989, to determine respondent's suitability for parole.
California law required the Board to set a release date
for respondent unless it found that -the public safety
requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this
individual.-  3041(b).  The Board found respondent un-
suitable for parole for numerous reasons, including the
heinous, atrocious, and cruel nature of his offense; the
mutilation of Ms. Washabaugh during or after the
murder; respondent's record of violence and assaultive
behavior; and respondent's commission of his second
murder while on parole for his first.  Supplemental App.
to Pet. for Cert. 45.
  Under the law in place at the time respondent
murdered Ms. Washabaugh, respondent would have been
entitled to subsequent suitability hearings on an annual
basis.  1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 165, 46.  In 1981, however,
the California Legislature had authorized the Board to
defer subsequent suitability hearings for up to three
years if the prisoner has been convicted of -more than
one offense which involves the taking of a life- and if
the Board -finds that it is not reasonable to expect that
parole would be granted at a hearing during the follow-
ing years and states the bases for the finding.-  Cal.
Penal Code Ann. 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982).  In light of
the considerations that led it to find respondent unsuit-
able for parole, and based on its conclusion that a longer
period of observation was required before a parole
release date could be projected, the Board determined
that it was not reasonable to expect that respondent
would be found suitable for parole in 1990 or 1991.
Pursuant to the 1981 amendment, the Board scheduled
the next hearing for 1992.
  Respondent then filed a federal habeas corpus petition
in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, asserting that he was being held
in custody in violation of the Federal Constitution.  See
28 U. S. C. 2254.  Respondent argued that as applied
to him, the 1981 amendment constituted an ex post facto
law barred by Article I, 10, of the United States
Constitution.  The District Court denied respondent's
habeas petition, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  16 F. 3d 1001 (1994).
Because -a prisoner cannot be paroled without first
having a parole hearing,- the Court of Appeals concluded
that -any retrospective law making parole hearings less
accessible would effectively increase the [prisoner's]
sentence and violate the ex post facto clause.-  Id., at
1004.  The Court of Appeals accordingly held that the
Board was constitutionally constrained to provide
respondent with annual parole suitability hearings, as
required by the law in effect when he committed his
crime.  Id., at 1006.
  We granted certiorari, 512 U. S. ___ (1994), and we
now reverse.

                           II
  Article I, 10, of the Constitution forbids the States
from passing any -ex post facto Law.-  In Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990), we reaffirmed that
the Ex Post Facto Clause incorporated -a term of art
with an established meaning at the time of the framing
of the Constitution.-  In accordance with this original
understanding, we have held that the Clause is aimed
at laws that -retroactively alter the definition of crimes
or increase the punishment for criminal acts.-  Id., at 43
(citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391-392 (1798)
(opinion of Chase, J.); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167,
169-170 (1925)).
  The legislation at issue here effects no change in the
definition of respondent's crime.  Instead, the question
before us is whether the 1981 amendment to 3041.5
increases the -punishment- attached to respondent's
crime.  In arguing that it does, respondent relies chiefly
on a trilogy of cases holding that a legislature may not
stiffen the -standard of punishment- applicable to crimes
that have already been committed.  See Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (1937); Miller v. Florida,
482 U. S. 423 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24
(1981).
  In Lindsey, we established the proposition that the
Constitution -forbids the application of any new punitive
measure to a crime already consummated.-  301 U. S.,
at 401.  The petitioners in Lindsey had been convicted
of grand larceny, and the sentencing provision in effect
at the time they committed their crimes provided for a
maximum sentence of -not more than fifteen years.-  Id.,
at 398.  The applicable law called for sentencing judges
to impose an indeterminate sentence up to whatever
maximum they selected, so long as it did not exceed 15
years.  Id., at 398, 400.  Before the petitioners were sen-
tenced, however, a new statute was passed that required
the judge to sentence the petitioners to the 15-year
maximum; under the new statute, the petitioners could
secure an earlier release only through the grace of the
parole board.  Id., at 398-399.  We held that the
application of this statute to petitioners violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause because -the measure of punishment
prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that
of the earlier.-  Id., at 401.
  Weaver and Miller held that the Ex Post Facto Clause
forbids the States from enhancing the measure of
punishment by altering the substantive -formula- used
to calculate the applicable sentencing range.  In Weaver,
the petitioner had been sentenced to 15 years in prison
for his crime of second-degree murder.  Both at the time
of his crime and at the time his sentence was imposed,
state statutes provided a formula for mandatory reduc-
tions to the terms of all prisoners who complied with
certain prison regulations and state laws.  The statute
that the petitioner challenged and that we invalidated
retroactively reduced the amount of -gain time- credits
available to prisoners under this formula.  Though the
statute preserved the possibility that some prisoners
might win back these credits if they convinced prison
officials to exercise their discretion to find that they
were especially deserving, see 450 U. S., at 34, n. 18, we
found that it effectively eliminated the lower end of the
possible range of prison terms.  Id., at 26-27, 31-33.
The statute at issue in Miller contained a similar defect.
The Florida sentencing scheme had established -pre-
sumptive sentencing ranges- for various offenses, which
sentencing judges were required to follow in the absence
of -clear and convincing reasons- for a departure.  At
the time that the petitioner in Miller committed his
crime, his presumptive sentencing range would have
been 3- to 4- years.  Before his sentencing, however,
the state legislature altered the formula for establishing
the presumptive sentencing range for certain sexual
offenses by increasing the -primary offense points-
assigned to those crimes.  As a result, petitioner's
presumptive range jumped to 5- to 7 years.  We held
that the resulting increase in the -quantum of punish-
ment- violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  482 U. S., at
433-434.
  Respondent insists that the California amendment
before us is indistinguishable from the legislation at
issue in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller, and he contends
that those cases control this one.  We disagree.  Both
before and after the 1981 amendment, California
punished the offense of second-degree murder with an
indeterminate sentence of -confinement in the state
prison for a term of 15 years to life.-  Cal. Penal Code
Ann. 190 (West 1982).  The amendment also left
unchanged the substantive formula for securing any
reductions to this sentencing range.  Thus, although 15
years was the formal -minimum- term of confinement,
respondent was able to secure a one-third -credit- or
reduction in this minimum by complying with prison
rules and regulations.  See ibid.; 2931.  The amend-
ment had no effect on the standards for fixing a prison-
er's initial date of -eligibility- for parole, see In re
Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 476, 703 P. 2d 100, 108 (1985),
or for determining his -suitability- for parole and setting
his release date, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. 3041,
3041.5 (West 1982).
  The 1981 amendment made only one change: it intro-
duced the possibility that after the initial parole hear-
ing, the Board would not have to hold another hearing
the very next year, or the year after that, if it found no
reasonable probability that respondent would be deemed
suitable for parole in the interim period.  3041.5(b)(2).
In contrast to the laws at issue in Lindsey, Weaver, and
Miller (which had the purpose and effect of enhancing
the range of available prison terms, see Miller, supra, at
433-434), the evident focus of the California amendment
was merely -`to relieve the [Board] from the costly and
time-consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hear-
ings'- for prisoners who have no reasonable chance of
being released.  In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d, at 473, 703
P.2d, at 106 (quoting legislative history).  Rather than
changing the sentencing range applicable to covered
crimes, the 1981 amendment simply -alters the method
to be followed- in fixing a parole release date under
identical substantive standards.  See Miller, supra, at
433 (contrasting adjustment to presumptive sentencing
range with change in -the method to be followed in
determining the appropriate sentence-); see also Dobbert
v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 293-294 (1977) (contrasting
change in the -quantum of punishment- with statute
that merely -altered the methods employed in determin-
ing whether the death penalty was to be imposed-).

                           III
  Respondent nonetheless urges us to hold that the Ex
Post Facto Clause forbids any legislative change that has
any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment.
In his view, there is -no principled way to determine
how significant a risk of enhanced confinement is to be
tolerated.-  Brief for Respondent 39.  Our cases have
never accepted this expansive view of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and we will not endorse it here.
  Respondent's approach would require that we invali-
date any of a number of minor (and perhaps inevitable)
mechanical changes that might produce some remote
risk of impact on a prisoner's expected term of confine-
ment.  Under respondent's approach, the judiciary would
be charged under the Ex Post Facto Clause with the
micromanagement of an endless array of legislative
adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures,
including such innocuous adjustments as changes to the
membership of the Board of Prison Terms, restrictions
on the hours that prisoners may use the prison law
library, reductions in the duration of the parole hearing,
restrictions on the time allotted for a convicted defend-
ant's right of allocution before a sentencing judge, and
page limitations on a defendant's objections to presen-
tence reports or on documents seeking a pardon from
the governor.  These and countless other changes might
create some speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a
prisoner's actual term of confinement by making it more
difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early
release, but that fact alone cannot end the matter for ex
post facto purposes.
  Indeed, contrary to the approach advocated by re-
spondent, we have long held that the question of what
legislative adjustments -will be held to be of sufficient
moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition-
must be a matter of -degree.-  Beazell, 269 U. S., at
171.  In evaluating the constitutionality of the 1981
amendment, we must determine whether it produces a
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment
attached to the covered crimes.  We have previously
declined to articulate a single -formula- for identifying
those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on
substantive crimes or punishments to fall within thee
constitutional prohibition, see id., at 171, and we have
no occasion to do so here.  The amendment creates only
the most speculative and attenuated possibility of
producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure
of punishment for covered crimes, and such conjectural
effects are insufficient under any threshold we might
establish under the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See Dobbert,
432 U. S., at 294 (refusing to accept -speculation- that
the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme
would be -more onerous- than under the old one).
  First, the amendment applies only to a class of
prisoners for whom the likelihood of release on parole is
quite remote.  The amendment enabled the Board to
extend the time between suitability hearings only for
those prisoners who have been convicted of -more than
one offense which involves the taking of a life.-  Cal.
Penal Code Ann. 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982).  The
California Supreme Court has noted that about 90% of
all prisoners are found unsuitable for parole at the
initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable at the
second and subsequent hearings.  In re Jackson, 39 Cal.
3d, at 473, 703 P. 2d, at 105.  In light of these num-
bers, the amendment -was seen as a means `to relieve
the [Board] from the costly and time-consuming responsi-
bility of scheduling parole hearings for prisoners who
have no chance of being released.'-  Ibid. (quoting
legislative history).
  Second, the Board's authority under the amendment is
carefully tailored to that end.  The amendment has no
effect on the date of any prisoner's initial parole suit-
ability hearing; it affects the timing only of subsequent
hearings.  Accordingly, the amendment has no effect on
any prisoner unless the Board has first concluded, after
a hearing, not only that the prisoner is unsuitable for
parole, but also that -it is not reasonable to expect that
parole would be granted at a hearing during the follow-
ing years.-  Cal. Penal Code Ann. 3041.5(b)(2) (West
1982).  -This is no arbitrary decision,- Morris v. Castro,
166 Cal. App. 3d 33, 38, 212 Cal. Rptr. 299, 302 (1985);
the Board must conduct -a full hearing and review- of
all relevant facts, ibid., and state the bases for its
finding.  Cal. Penal Code Ann. 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982).
Though California law is not entirely clear on this point,
the reliability of the Board's determination may also be
enhanced by the possibility of an administrative appeal.
See Tit. 15, Cal. Code of Regulations, 2050 (1994).
  Moreover, the Board retains the authority to tailor the
frequency of subsequent suitability hearings to the
particular circumstances of the individual prisoner.  The
default requirement is an annual hearing, but the Board
may defer the next hearing up to two years more
depending on the circumstances.  Cal. Penal Code Ann.
3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982).  Thus, a mass murderer who
has participated in repeated violent crimes both in
prison and while on parole could perhaps expect a 3-
year delay between suitability hearings, while a prisoner
who poses a lesser threat to the -public safety,- see
3041(b), might receive only a 2-year delay.  In light of
the particularized findings required under the amend-
ment and the broad discretion given to the Board, the
narrow class of prisoners covered by the amendment
cannot reasonably expect that their prospects for early
release on parole would be enhanced by the opportunity
of annual hearings.  For these prisoners, the amendment
simply allows the Board to avoid the futility of going
through the motions of reannouncing its denial of parole
suitability on a yearly basis.
  Respondent suggests that there is some chance that
the amendment might nevertheless produce an increased
term of confinement for some prisoners who might
experience a change of circumstances that could render
them suitable for parole during the period between their
hearings.  Brief for Respondent 39.  Respondent fails,
however, to provide any support for his speculation that
the multiple murderers and other prisoners subject to
the amendment might experience an unanticipated
change that is sufficiently monumental to alter their
suitability for release on parole.  Even if we assume the
possibility of such a change, moreover, there is no
reason to conclude that the amendment will have any
effect on any prisoner's actual term of confinement, for
the current record provides no basis for concluding that
a prisoner who experiences a drastic change of circum-
stances would be precluded from seeking an expedited
hearing from the Board.  Indeed, the California Supreme
Court has suggested that under the circumstances
hypothesized by respondent -the Board could advance
the suitability hearing,- In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d, at
475, 703 P. 2d, at 107, and the California Department
of Corrections indicates in its brief that the Board's
-practice- is to -review for merit any communication
from an inmate asking for an earlier suitability hear-
ing,- Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 1.  If the Board's
decision to postpone the hearing is subject to administra-
tive appeal, the controlling regulations also seem to
preserve the possibility of a belated appeal.  See Tit. 15,
Cal. Code of Regulations, 2050 (1994) (time limits for
administrative appeals -are directory only and may be
extended-).  An expedited hearing by the Board-either
on its own volition or pursuant to an order entered on
an administrative appeal-would remove any possibility
of harm even under the hypothetical circumstances
suggested by respondent.
  Even if a prisoner were denied an expedited hearing,
there is no reason to think that such postponement
would extend any prisoner's actual period of confine-
ment.  According to the California Supreme Court, the
possibility of immediate release after a finding of
suitability for parole is largely -theoretica[l],- In re
Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d, at 474, 703 P. 2d, at 106; in many
cases, the prisoner's parole release date comes at least
several years after a finding of suitability.  To the
extent that these cases are representative, it follows that
-the `practical effect' of a hearing postponement is not
significant.-  Id., at 474, 703 P. 2d, at 106-107.  This is
because the Board is bound by statute to consider -any
sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole
release dates- with an eye toward establishing -uniform
terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in
respect to their threat to the public.-  Cal. Penal Code
Ann. 3041(a) (West 1982).  Under these standards, the
fact that a prisoner had been -suitable- for parole prior
to the date of the hearing certainly would be -relevant-
to the Board's decision in setting an actual release date,
and the Board retains the discretion to expedite the
release date of such a prisoner.  Thus, a prisoner who
could show that he was -suitable- for parole two years
prior to such a finding by the Board might well be
entitled to secure a release date that reflects that fact.
Such a prisoner's ultimate date of release would be
entirely unaffected by the change in the timing of
suitability hearings.

                           IV
  Given these circumstances, we conclude that the
California legislation at issue creates only the most
speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the mea-
sure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.  The
Ninth Circuit's judgment that the amendment violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause is accordingly reversed.

                                      It is so ordered.